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Hedonism

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Hedonism refers to the prioritization of pleasure in one's lifestyle, actions, or thoughts. The term can include a number of theories or practices across philosophy, art, and psychology, encompassing both sensory pleasure and more intellectual or personal pursuits, but can also be used in everyday parlance as a pejorative for the egoistic pursuit of short-term gratification at the expense of others.[1][2]

The term originates in ethical philosophy, where axiological or value hedonism is the claim that pleasure is the sole form of intrinsic value,[3][4][5] while normative or ethical hedonism claims that pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain for oneself or others are the ultimate expressions of ethical good.[1] Applied to well-being or what is good for someone, it is the thesis that pleasure and suffering are the only components of well-being.[6]

Psychological or motivational hedonism claims that human behavior is psychologically determined by desires to increase pleasure and to decrease pain.[3][1]

Psychological hedonism

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Psychological hedonism, also known as motivational hedonism, is an empirical theory about what motivates us: it states that all actions by humans aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain.[7][8] This is usually understood in combination with egoism, i.e. that each person only aims at their happiness.[9] For example, Thomas Hobbes theorized that a person's ego was the primary impulse in determining their behavior.[10][11] Human actions rely on beliefs about what causes pleasure. False beliefs may mislead and thus each person's actions may fail to result in pleasure, but even failed actions are motivated by considerations of pleasure, according to psychological hedonism.[3] The paradox of hedonism concerns the thesis that pleasure-seeking behavior is self-defeating in the sense that it results in less actual pleasure than would result from following other motives.[3][12]

Psychological hedonism gives a straightforward theory explaining the totality of human behavior. It has intuitive plausibility because pleasure-seeking behavior is a common phenomenon, and may indeed dominate human conduct at times; however, the generalization of psychological hedonism as an explanation for all behavior is highly controversial.[3][9][1] Critics point to counterexamples involving actions that seem to have no plausible explanation in terms of pleasure, such as egoistic motives for things other than pleasure (e.g. health, self-improvement, post-mortem fame), and altruistic motives (e.g. pursuing one's child's happiness, sacrificing one's life for a greater cause).[7][9] Psychological hedonists reinterpret such cases in terms of pleasure-seeking behavior, for example positing that seeing one's children happy or knowing that one's death will have been meaningful brings pleasure to the person sacrificing their immediate pleasure.[7][9][3]

Critics also contend that, via introspection, one can conclude that the pursuit of pleasure is only one type of motivating force among others and that reinterpreting every case in terms of pleasure/pain contradicts this.[1] Critics also contend that psychological hedonism's basic claim of what motivates humans falls within the realm of the science of psychology rather than philosophy, and as such demands experimental evidence to confirm or contradict it.[3][9]

Ethical hedonism

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Ethical hedonism or normative hedonism, as defined here, is the thesis that considerations of increasing pleasure and decreasing pain determine what people should do or which action is right.[1] However, it is sometimes defined in a wider sense in terms of intrinsic value, in which case it includes axiological hedonism as defined below.[8][3] It is different from psychological hedonism since it prescribes rather than describes human behavior. In the narrow sense, ethical hedonism is a form of consequentialism since it determines the rightness of an action based on its consequences, which are measured here in terms of pleasure and pain.[7] As such, it is subject to the main arguments in favor and against consequentialism. On the positive side, these include the intuition that the consequences of human actions matter and that, through them, humans ought to make the world a better place.[13] On the negative side, consequentialism would entail that humans rarely if ever know right from wrong since human knowledge of the future is rather limited and the consequences of even simple actions may be vast.[14] As a form of hedonism, it has some initial intuitive appeal since pleasure and pain seem to be relevant to how people should act.[1] But it has been argued that it is morally objectionable to see pleasure and pain as the only factors relevant to what humans should do since this position seems to ignore, for example, values of justice, friendship and truth.[7][1] Ethical hedonism is usually concerned with both pleasure and pain. But the more restricted version in the form of negative consequentialism or negative utilitarianism focuses only on reducing suffering.[3][15][16][17] Ethical hedonism is said to have been started by Aristippus of Cyrene, who held the idea that pleasure is the highest good and later was revived by Jeremy Bentham.[18][19]

Ethical hedonist theories can vary in relation to whose pleasure is held within the circle of concern. Individualist forms of hedonism can overlap with Ethical egoism, dictating that each agent has no moral obligation beyond their own pleasure. This position is usually not held in very high esteem.[20][1] Altruist theories, commonly known by the term "classical utilitarianism", are more respectable in the philosophical community. They hold that the agent should maximize the sum-total of everyone's happiness.[21][1] This sum-total includes the agent's pleasure as well, but only as one factor among many. A common objection against utilitarianism is that it is too demanding.[22][23] This is most pronounced in cases where the agent has to sacrifice his own happiness in order to promote someone else's happiness. For example, various commentators have directed this argument against Peter Singer's position, who suggests along similar lines that the right thing to do for most people living in developed countries would be to donate a significant portion of their income to charities, which appears overly demanding to many.[24][25] Singer justifies his position by pointing out that the suffering that can be avoided in third world countries this way considerably outweighs the pleasure gained from how the money would be spent otherwise.[26] Another common objection to utilitarianism is that it disregards the personal nature of moral duties, for example, that it may be more important to promote the happiness of others close to each individual person, such as family and friends, even if the alternative course of actions would result in slightly more happiness for a stranger.[27]

Axiological hedonism

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Axiological hedonism is the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value. It has also been referred to as evaluative hedonism or value hedonism, and it is sometimes included in ethical hedonism.[3][7][5] A closely related theory often treated together with axiological hedonism is hedonism about well-being, which holds that pleasure and pain are the only constituents of well-being and thereby the only things that are good for someone.[6] Central to the understanding of axiological hedonism is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. An entity has intrinsic value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake.[28][29] Instrumental value, on the other hand, is ascribed to things that are valuable only as a means to something else.[30] For example, tools like cars or microwaves are said to be instrumentally valuable in virtue of the function they perform, while the happiness they cause is intrinsically valuable. Axiological hedonism is a claim about intrinsic value, not about value at large.[5]

Within the scope of axiological hedonism, there are two competing theories about the exact relation between pleasure and value: quantitative hedonism and qualitative hedonism.[3][1] Quantitative hedonists, following Jeremy Bentham, hold that the specific content or quality of a pleasure-experience is not relevant to its value, which only depends on its quantitative features: intensity and duration.[3][31] For example, on this account, an experience of intense pleasure of indulging in food and sex is worth more than an experience of subtle pleasure of looking at fine art or of engaging in a stimulating intellectual conversation. Qualitative hedonists, following John Stuart Mill, object to this version on the grounds that it threatens to turn axiological hedonism into a "philosophy of swine".[1] Instead, they argue that the quality is another factor relevant to the value of a pleasure-experience, for example, that the lower pleasures of the body are less valuable than the higher pleasures of the mind.[32]

One appeal of axiological hedonism is that it provides a simple and unified account of what matters. It also reflects the introspective insight that pleasure feels valuable as something worth seeking.[3] It has been influential throughout the history of western philosophy but has received a lot of criticism in contemporary philosophy.[1][8][7] Most objections can roughly be divided into 2 types: (1) objections to the claim that pleasure is a sufficient condition of intrinsic value or that all pleasure is intrinsically valuable; (2) objections to the claim that pleasure is a necessary condition of intrinsic value or that there are no intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure.[3] Opponents in the first category usually try to point to cases of pleasure that seem to either lack value or have negative value, like sadistic pleasure or pleasure due to a false belief.[8] Qualitative hedonists can try to account for these cases by devaluing pleasures associated with the problematic qualities.[1] Other ways to respond to this argument include rejecting the claim that these pleasures really have no or negative intrinsic value or rejecting that these cases involve pleasure at all.[3]

Various thought experiments have been proposed for the second category, i.e. that there are intrinsically valuable things other than pleasure. The most well-known one in recent philosophy is Robert Nozick's experience machine.[33][1][3] Nozick asks whether people would agree to be permanently transported into a simulated reality more pleasurable than actual life. He thinks that it is rational to decline this offer since other things besides pleasure matter. This has to do with the fact that it matters to be in touch with reality and to actually "make a difference in the world" instead of just appearing to do so since life would be meaningless otherwise.[33][1] Axiological hedonists have responded to this thought experiment by pointing out that human intuitions about what people should do are mistaken, for example, that there is a cognitive bias to prefer the status quo and that if people were to find out that people had spent human life already within the experience machine, people would be likely to choose to stay within the machine.[34][1] Another objection within this category is that many things besides pleasure seem valuable to us, like virtue, beauty, knowledge or justice. For example, G. E. Moore suggests in a famous thought experiment that a world consisting only of a beautiful landscape is better than an ugly and disgusting world even if there is no conscious being to observe and enjoy or suffer either world.[3][35] One way for the axiological hedonist to respond is to explain the value of these things in terms of instrumental values. So, for example, virtue is good because it tends to increase the overall pleasure of the virtuous person or of the people around them. This can be paired with holding that there is a psychological bias to mistake stable instrumental values for intrinsic values, thus explaining the opponent's intuition.[36] While this strategy may work for some cases, it is controversial whether it can be applied to all counterexamples.

Aesthetic hedonism

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Aesthetic hedonism is the influential view in the field of aesthetics that beauty or aesthetic value can be defined in terms of pleasure, e.g. that for an object to be beautiful is for it to cause pleasure or that the experience of beauty is always accompanied by pleasure.[37][38][39] A prominent articulation of this position comes from Thomas Aquinas, who treats beauty as "that which pleases in the very apprehension of it".[40] Immanuel Kant explains this pleasure through a harmonious interplay between the faculties of understanding and imagination.[41] A further question for aesthetic hedonists is how to explain the relation between beauty and pleasure. This problem is akin to the Euthyphro dilemma, i.e. the issue whether something is beautiful because it is enjoyed or whether it is enjoyed because it is beautiful.[42] Identity theorists solve this problem by denying that there is a difference between beauty and pleasure: they identify beauty, or the appearance of it, with the experience of aesthetic pleasure.[41]

Aesthetic hedonists usually restrict and specify the notion of pleasure in various ways in order to avoid obvious counterexamples. One important distinction in this context is the difference between pure and mixed pleasure.[41] Pure pleasure excludes any form of pain or unpleasant feeling while the experience of mixed pleasure can include unpleasant elements.[43] But beauty can involve mixed pleasure, for example, in the case of a beautifully tragic story, which is why mixed pleasure is usually allowed in aesthetic hedonist conceptions of beauty.[41]

Another problem faced by aesthetic hedonist theories is that people are known to have taken pleasure from many things that are not beautiful. One way to address this issue is to associate beauty with a special type of pleasure: aesthetic or disinterested pleasure.[44][45][46] A pleasure is disinterested if it is indifferent to the existence of the beautiful object or if it did not arise due to an antecedent desire through means-end reasoning.[47][41] For example, the joy of looking at a beautiful landscape would still be valuable if it turned out that this experience was an illusion, which would not be true if this joy was due to seeing the landscape as a valuable real estate opportunity.[44] Opponents of hedonism usually concede that many experiences of beauty are pleasurable but deny that this is true for all cases.[37] For example, a cold jaded critic may still be a good judge of beauty due to his years of experience but lack the joy that initially accompanied his work.[41] One way to avoid this objection is to allow responses to beautiful things to lack pleasure while insisting that all beautiful things merit pleasure, that aesthetic pleasure is the only appropriate response to them.[37]

Basic concepts

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Pleasure and pain

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Main articles: Pleasure and Pain
Photo of statue Bacchante and Infant Faun
Bacchante and Infant Faun by Frederick William MacMonnies, 1894.

Pleasure and pain are fundamental experiences about what is attractive and aversive, influencing how people feel, think, and act.[48] They play a central role in all forms of hedonism.[49] Both pleasure and pain come in degrees corresponding to their intensity. They are typically understood as a continuum ranging from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees.[50] However, some hedonists reject the idea that pleasure and pain form a symmetric pair and suggest instead that avoiding pain is more important than producing pleasure.[51]

The nature of pleasure and pain is disputed and affects the plausibility of various versions of hedonism. In everyday language, these concepts are often understood in a narrow sense associated with specific phenomena, like the pleasure of food and sex or the pain of an injury.[52] However, hedonists usually take a wider perspective in which pleasure and pain cover any positive or negative experiences. In this broad sense, anything that feels good is a pleasure, including the joy of watching a sunset, whereas anything that feels bad is a pain, including the sorrow of losing a loved one.[53] A traditionally influential position says that pleasure and pain are specific bodily sensations, similar to the sensations of hot and cold. A more common view in contemporary philosophy holds that pleasure and pain are attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. This view implies that they do not have a specific location in the body and do not arise in isolation since they are always directed at an object that people enjoy or suffer.[54]

Measurement

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Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in methods of measuring pleasure and pain to guide decision-making and gain a deeper understanding of their causes. A common approach is to use self-report questionnaires in which people are asked to quantify how pleasant or unpleasant an experience is. For example, some questionnaires use a nine-point scale from -4 for the most unpleasant experiences, to +4 for the most pleasant ones. Some methods rely on memory and ask individuals to retrospectively assess their experiences. A different approach is for individuals to evaluate their experiences while they are happening to avoid biases and inaccuracies introduced by memory.[55]

In either form, the measurement of pleasure and pain poses various challenges. As a highly subjective phenomenon, it is difficult to establish a standardized metric. Moreover, asking people to rate their experiences using an artificially constructed scale may not accurately reflect their subjective experiences. A closely related problem concerns comparisons between individuals since different people may use the scales differently and thus arrive at different values even if they had similar experiences.[56] Neuroscientists avoid some of these challenges by using neuroimaging techniques such as PET scans and fMRI. However, this approach comes with new difficulties of its own since the neurological basis of happiness is not yet fully understood.[57]

Based on the idea that individual experiences of pleasure and pain can be quantified, Jeremy Bentham proposed the hedonistic calculus as a method to combine various episodes to arrive at their total contribution to happiness. This makes it possible to quantitatively compare different courses of action based on the experiences they produce to choose the course with the highest overall contribution to happiness. Bentham considered several factors for each pleasurable experience: its intensity and duration, the likelihood that it occurs, its temporal distance, the likelihood that it causes further experiences of pleasure and pain, and the number of people affected. Some simplified versions of the hedonic calculus focus primarily on what is intrinsically valuable to a person and only consider two factors: intensity and duration.[58]

Happiness, well-being, and eudaimonia

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Main articles: Happiness, Well-being, and Eudaimonia

Some theorists formulate hedonism in terms of happiness rather than pleasure and pain. According to a common interpretation, happiness is the balance of pleasure over pain. This means that a person is happy if they have more pleasure than pain and unhappy if the balance is overall negative.[59] There are also other ways to understand happiness that do not fully align with the traditional account of hedonism. One view defines happiness as life satisfaction. This means that a person is happy if they have a favorable attitude toward their life, for example, by being satisfied with their life as a whole or by judging it to be good overall. This attitude may be affected by the balance of pleasure over pain but can also be shaped by other factors.[60]

Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person.[61] According to a common view, pleasure is one component of well-being. It is controversial whether it is the only factor and what other factors there are, such as health, knowledge, and friendship. Another approach focuses on desires, saying that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires.[62] The view that the balance of pleasure over pain is the only source of well-being is called prudential hedonism.[63]

Eudaimonia is a form of well-being rooted in ancient Greek thought, serving as a foundation of many forms of hedonism during this period. Aristotle understood eudaimonia as a type of flourishing in which a person is happy by leading a fulfilling life and manifesting their inborn capacities. Ethical theories based on eudaimonia are typically not pure versions of hedonism since they combine an interest in long-term happiness with a form of virtue ethics advocating an active lifestyle focused on self-realization.[64]

Paradox of hedonism and hedonic treadmill

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Main articles: Paradox of hedonism and Hedonic treadmill

The paradox of hedonism is the thesis that the direct pursuit of pleasure is counterproductive. It says that conscious attempts to become happy usually backfire, acting as obstacles to one's personal happiness. According to one interpretation, the best way to produce pleasure is to follow other endeavors, with pleasure being a by-product rather than the goal itself. For example, this view suggests that a tennis player who tries to win a game may enjoy the activity more than a tennis player who tries to maximize their enjoyment. It is controversial to what extent the paradox of hedonism is true since, at least in some cases, the pursuit of pleasure is successful.[65]

A related phenomenon, the hedonic treadmill is the theory that people return to a stable level of happiness after significant positive or negative changes to their life circumstances. This suggests that good or bad events affect a person's happiness temporarily but not in the long term—their overall level of happiness tends to revert to a baseline as they get used to the changed situation. For instance, studies on lottery winners indicate that their happiness initially increases as the newly acquired wealth augments their living standards but returns to its original level after about one year. If true, this effect would undermine efforts to increase happiness in the long term, including personal efforts to lead a healthy lifestyle and social efforts to create a free, just, and prosperous society. While there is some empirical support for this effect, it is controversial how strong this tendency is and whether it applies to all fields or only to certain aspects of life.[66]

Non-hedonism and asceticism

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Non-hedonist theories reject certain aspects of hedonism. One form of non-hedonism says that pleasure is one thing in life that matters but not the only thing. Another form argues that some pleasures are good while others are bad. The strongest rejection of hedonism, sometimes termed anti-hedonism, claims that all pleasures are bad. Motivations to adopt this view include the idea that pleasure is an irrational emotion and that the pursuit of pleasure is an obstacle that prevents people from leading a good life.[67]

Asceticism is a lifestyle dedicated to a program of self-discipline that renounces worldly pleasures. It can take various forms, including abstinence from sex and drugs, fasting, withdrawal from society, and practices like prayer and meditation. This lifestyle is often motivated by religious aspirations to become close to the divine, reach a heightened spiritual state, or purify oneself.[68] Most forms of asceticism are opposed to hedonism and its pursuit of pleasure. However, there are forms of ascetic hedonism that combine the two views, for example, by asserting that the right form of ascetic practice leads to higher overall happiness by replacing simple sensory pleasures with deeper and more meaningful spiritual pleasures.[69]

History

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Etymology

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The term hedonism derives from the Greek hēdonismos (ἡδονισμός, 'delight'; from ἡδονή, hēdonē, 'pleasure'), which is a cognate from Proto-Indo-European swéh₂dus through Ancient Greek hēdús (ἡδύς, 'pleasant to the taste or smell, sweet') or hêdos (ἧδος, 'delight, pleasure') + suffix -ismos (-ισμός, 'ism').

Opposite to hedonism, there is hedonophobia, which is a strong aversion to experiencing pleasure. According to medical author William C. Shiel Jr., hedonophobia is "an abnormal, excessive, and persistent fear of pleasure."[70] The condition of being unable to experience pleasure is anhedonia.

Ancient

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Picture of Aristippus
Aristippus of Cyrene is often seen as the first proponent of philosophical hedonism.

Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, written around 2100–2000 BCE.[71] A central topic in ancient Greek thought, Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE)[72], he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of Cyrenaics he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences.[73] Plato (c. 428–347 BCE)[74] critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality.[75] Following a similar approach, Aristotle (384–322 BCE)[76] associated pleasure with eudaimonia or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.[77]

Epicurus (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a tranquil state of mind, and avoid pain.[78] Following Antisthenes (c. 446—366 BCE), the Cynics warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom.[79] The Stoics also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.[80] Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.[81]

In ancient India, the Charvaka school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the non-existence of God or an afterlife led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended for a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain schools of thought.[82] In ancient China, Yang Zhu (c. 440–360 BCE)[a] argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of Yangism.[84]

Medieval

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Picture of al-Razi
Inspired by Epicureanism, al-Razi developed a moderate hedonism.

Hedonist philosophy received less attention in medieval philosophy.[85] The early Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE),[86] was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God.[87] Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a beatific vision of God.[88] In Islamic philosophy, al-Razi (c. 864—925 or 932 CE) was influenced by Epicureanism and defended a subtle form of hedonism, emphasizing moderation and the avoidance of excess.[89] Both al-Farabi (c. 878–950 CE)[90] and Avicenna (980–1037 CE)[91] asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.[92]

Modern and contemporary

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At the transition to the early modern period, Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with Christian ethics, suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues.[93] Hedonism gained prominence during the Age of Enlightenment.[94] According to Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679)[95] psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation.[96] John Locke (1632-1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil.[97] Joseph Butler (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects.[98] According to David Hume (1711–1776),[99] pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions.[100] The libertine novels of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or sexual restraint.[101]

Painting of Jeremy Bentham
Jeremy Bentham formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)[102] developed an influential form of hedonism known as classical utilitarianism. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the hedonic calculus to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration.[103] His student John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)[104] feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body.[105] Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.[106]

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)[107] rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided.[108] An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by Franz Brentano (1838–1917)[109]. He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects[b]—a position also later defended by Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999).[111] Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early psychoanalytic theory. He stated that the pleasure principle describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the reality principle represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.[112]

The 20th century also saw various criticisms of hedonism.[113] G. E. Moore (1873–1958)[114] rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his axiological pluralism, there are other sources, such as beauty and knowledge,[115] a criticism also shared by W. D. Ross (1877–1971).[116] Both C. D. Broad (1887–1971) and Richard Brandt (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value.[117] Robert Nozick (1938–2002) used his experience machine thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.[118]

In response to these and similar criticisms, Fred Feldman (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved.[119] Peter Singer (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about animal welfare.[c] He has advocated effective altruism, relying on empirical evidence and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact.[121] Inspired by the philosophy of Albert Camus (1913–1960), Michel Onfray (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form.[122] David Pearce (1959–present) has developed a transhumanist version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future.[123] The emergence of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.[124]

Criticism

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Critics of hedonism have objected to its exclusive concentration on pleasure as valuable or that the retentive breadth of dopamine is limited.[125]

In particular, G. E. Moore offered a thought experiment in criticism of pleasure as the sole bearer of value: he imagined two worlds—one of exceeding beauty and the other a heap of filth. Neither of these worlds will be experienced by anyone. The question then is if it is better for the beautiful world to exist than the heap of filth. In this, Moore implied that states of affairs have value beyond conscious pleasure, which he said spoke against the validity of hedonism.[126]

Perhaps the most famous objection to hedonism is Robert Nozick's famous experience machine. Nozick asks to hypothetically imagine a machine that will allow humans to experience whatever people want—if a person wants to experience making friends, the machine will give this to its user. Nozick claims that by hedonistic logic, people should remain in this machine for the rest of their lives. However, he gives three reasons why this is not a preferable scenario: firstly, because people want to do certain things, as opposed to merely experience them; secondly, people want to be a certain kind of person, as opposed to an 'indeterminate blob' and thirdly, because such a thing would limit their experiences to only what people can imagine.[33] Peter Singer, a hedonistic utilitarian, and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek have both argued against such an objection by saying that it only provides an answer to certain forms of hedonism, and ignores others.[127]

See also

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References

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Notes

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  1. ^ Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.[83]
  2. ^ According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.[110]
  3. ^ Singer was initially a proponent of preference utilitarianism but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.[120]

Citations

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Weijers.
  2. ^ "Hedonism". www.merriam-webster.com. Retrieved 30 January 2021.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Moore 2019.
  4. ^ "Psychological hedonism". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 29 January 2021.
  5. ^ a b c Haybron, Daniel M. (2008). The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being. Oxford University Press. p. 62.
  6. ^ a b Crisp, Roger (2017). "Well-Being: 4.1 Hedonism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  7. ^ a b c d e f g Craig, Edward (1996). "Hedonism". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
  8. ^ a b c d Borchert, Donald (2006). "Hedonism". Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Macmillan.
  9. ^ a b c d e "Psychological hedonism". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 2 February 2021.
  10. ^ Jackson, J.M. (2013). Social Psychology, Past and Present: An Integrative Orientation. Taylor & Francis. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-134-99512-7. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
  11. ^ Abizadeh 2018, p. 145.
  12. ^ Dietz 2019.
  13. ^ Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2019). "Consequentialism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 2 February 2021.
  14. ^ "Consequentialism". Ethics Unwrapped. The University of Texas at Austin. Retrieved 2 February 2021.
  15. ^ Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Sources

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Further reading

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